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THE AFRICAN EXPERIENCE 
DROUGHT AND FAMINE IN THE DRY ZONE 
RANDALL BAKER 
T his paper concerns the changing climate in 
the semiarid regions of Africa and the techno-
logical response to it. Often the central issue in 
physical and social change in Africa seems to 
be interpreting a sketchy but rapidly evolving 
base of "evidence" and trying to decide the 
process that the evidence would suggest is at 
work. This is a far from easy task, requiring 
inspired guesswork as much as proof, but 
clearly it is absolutely central to formulating an 
appropriate policy response. 
One thing is indisputably clear: the circum-
stances in the semiarid belt stretching from 
Senegal to Ethiopia and to places in eastern 
and southeastern Africa have reached cata-
strophic human proportions. No one who 
looks at television or reads a newspaper can 
fail to have noticed that. Furthermore, because 
of the catastrophic level of human suffering 
our attention not unnaturally is focused on 
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relief and the immediate problems of keeping 
alive a large number of people on the edge of 
extinction. But this crisis-management ap-
proach, usually associated with natural disas-
ters such as floods, famines, and earthquakes, 
presupposes that we are coping with an 
anomalous and sudden visitation and that, if 
we can carry the population through the 
immediate disaster, there is a reasonable 
chance that they can reestablish something 
resembling a "normal" life again. What has 
concerned many writers about Africa is the 
almost unbroken persistence of drought since 
1968 and of dry conditions for the last twenty-
five years (Lamb, P. J. 1982; Nicholson 1983) 
and the fear that there is an underlying natural 
or human-induced process at work preventing 
a return to "normality." Nicholson (1983) 
examines the possibilities of changed surface 
conditions intensifying and prolonging the 
drought. Hence the authorities would have to 
plan for a worsening situation in the long 
term. Indeed, the absence of much attention to 
the drought in the early 1980s might suggest 
that people are adapting to it or that it has 
become accepted as "normal" even though 
conditions have rivaled those in the depths of 
the early 1970s. 
But complicating matters even beyond this 
"will it get better or not?" level of debate is the 
other question of "what is causing the present 
crisis?" There are those who suggest that we 
are dealing with an aberration in the global 
atmospheric circulation, causing a failure in 
the essentially monsoonal rain systems of these 
areas. Some of these workers postulate a long-
term (two hundred-year) cyclical phenomenon 
reaching its trough around the year 2025 
(Lamb, H. H. 1983). Others suggest that 
evidences of earlier droughts of similar inten-
sity indicate that this one is nothing too far 
out of the "ordinary" and that our expecta-
tions may be too much influenced by a wetter 
phase during the 1950s (Kerr 1985). Of course, 
the fact that there are many more people 
around today still drawing their subsistence 
from the natural environment than there were 
during those earlier occurrences-though 
many of them have been driven away between 
1968 and now-may make the impact of the 
drought that much more terrible. But it does 
not make it in any way a fundamentally 
different process. Then there are those, per-
haps best exemplified by Kenneth Hare in his 
paper to the United Nations Conference on 
Desertification held in Nairobi in 1977, who 
say there is no evidence to "prove" climatic 
change, which is not the same thing as saying 
that it is not happening. 
So one group says there is a major systemic 
climatic change process, another says it is just 
more of the same (drought is "normal"), and a 
third group says we cannot prove anything. Of 
course, choosing among these theories for 
Africa is severely constrained by the short 
period of time for which data have been 
collected. There are almost no reliable records 
of climatic phenomena in the semiarid region 
much before 1900, and indeed much later in 
many places. Thus much of the "evidence" is 
of a secondary nature (lake levels, tree rings, 
varves, and the like) and this gives rise to 
internecine disputes in the scientific commu-
nity on the nature of evidence and the 
confusion of cause and effect. 
The school of thought encouraged some-
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what by Hare's often misinterpreted "not 
proven" verdict has focused on the issue of 
mismanagement. Briefly, this theory states 
that the combination of growing human and 
animal population (Worldwatch Institute 1985 
puts the blame squarely on this factor); the 
expansion of people into marginal and fragile 
environments such as woodlands, hillslopes, 
and river margins; inappropriate technology 
(such as the mouldboard plow used in Dust 
Bowl days); and the colonial and postcolonial 
preoccupation with monocultures of export 
crops have all contributed to' create a severe 
ecological imbalance leading to land exhaus-
tion, degradation, and erosion. On the one 
hand, it is said, this can lead to the appearance 
of "desertification" in much the same way that 
a worsening climate can. Furthermore, the 
degraded state of the environment means that 
when droughts come along, as they usually do 
in the semiarid belt, then their impact will be 
that much greater because there is less intrinsic 
resiliance in the system to withstand them. 
Secondly, they argue, largely with the aid of 
computer models of the atmosphere, that the 
mismanagement of the land can, in itself, lead 
to climatic change resulting from increased 
albedo (Charney 1975), or dust in the atmo-
sphere (McLeod 1976), or a reduction in soil 
moisture reducing the release of latent heat to 
the atmosphere (Walker and Rowntree 1973) 
and preventing the "triggering" effect of the 
moisture-laden air masses passing over the 
savannas and Sahel from the coast. Scientists 
label such relationships the bio-geophysical 
feedback effect. 
Although some writers (Kerr 1985) boldly 
dismiss the mismanagement argument simply 
on the basis of the scale of the present drought 
and its extent in Africa, it is quite possible that 
what we are dealing with is a combination of 
climatic phenomena and mismanagement, but 
what we cannot be sure about is whether the 
climatic circumstances are part of a long-term 
deterioration that would seriously reduce the 
options open to the policymakers. They, like 
much of the scientific community, are ex-
tremely confused by the conflicting "evi-
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dence," or the "Information Crisis," as I 
termed it (Baker 1976a). On the one hand, the 
climatic-change argument is attractive because 
it absolves policymakers from any shadow of 
blame or responsibility and renders the whole 
thing, in the language of insurance policies, an 
act of God. But clearly assembling and un-
scrambling the evidence is important whether 
one is thinking of rehabilitation or retreat. 
Norman Rosenberg demonstrates the rise in 
temperature associated with, possibly, the 
increase in CO, in the atmosphere and goes on 
to explore the various, sometimes conflicting, 
consequences this might or might not have for 
the granary of much of the world, the Midwest 
(Rosenberg 1986). How much greater then is 
the difficulty of extrapolation of effect or 
response in Africa with much poorer data, a 
monsoonal system, far fewer options, and a 
base of very little capital to insulate the 
grower? 
Technological adaptation and innovation 
in the Great Plains area is reviewed, but with 
very little predictive extrapolations, by the 
Office of Science and Technology (OT A 
1983). Technology can be a very wild card 
indeed. Major studies of the Great Plains fifty 
and twenty years ago, respectively, assumed 
that there was little or no further potential for 
irrigation in the Great Plains (Great Plains 
Committee 1936; Ottoson, et. a!. 1966). They 
could not have foreseen the tremendous 
advances in center pivot irrigation which now 
supplies water to the majority of the Nebraska 
corn crop. On the other hand, much of the 
water technology translated from the United 
States to Africa in the 1960s and 1970s is 
thought to have helped induce overgrazing 
and widespread land destruction. Similarly, 
the enormous effort in genetic research in 
grain crops, widely associated with the "Green 
Revolution" and India's progress toward self-
sufficiency in food production, has not found 
its parallel in Africa. There the millets and 
sorghums remained largely neglected, primari-
ly because they were not part of the colonial 
cash crop package. At the same time, work 
advanced on cocoa, coffee, and cotton. But 
the crops that kept many Africans alive, 
especially in the semiarid regions, remained 
virtually untouched. There has not been a 
simliar green revolution for Africa and indeed 
one would be difficult because of the cost of 
irrigation, pesticides, fertilizer, and hybrid seed 
for some of the poorest and least commercia-
lized farmers in the world. The reasons why a 
food revolution of Asian proportions has not 
occurred in Africa have recently been out-
lined, and there is a reluctance to suggest the 
same sort of technological breakthrough in the 
African situation (Norman 1985). The concep-
tual difficulties of coping with the African 
dilemma are clearly very great indeed, especial-
ly as so much attention has to be directed 
instead towards simply staying alive. 
THE CLIMATIC CHANGE ARGUMENT 
Research work on climatic change in 
Africa is still in its infancy and investigations 
are revealing not only new insights into the 
possible underlying processes but also into the 
historical precedents for the incidence, extent, 
and severity of drought. These trends have 
been reviewed by Nicholson (1983). Apart 
from the sources provided by oral tradition, 
which are bound to be anecdotal and difficult 
to verify, workers have had to rely on such 
secondary evidence as the observable record of 
changes in the level of basins of inland 
drainage like Lake Chad. Writers and travelers 
in the nineteenth century, notably David 
Livingstone, wrote frequently of Africa "dry-
ing up." On a more rigorously scientific basis, 
the study of lake margins combined with oral 
tradition (migrations, famines, etc.) suggests at 
least two other periods of drought comparable 
in intensity to what is happening now; the first 
was between 1736 and 1758 and the second 
between 1820 and 1840. At least two other 
incidences of major drought have been record-
ed this century, the last being in the 1940s. 
However, on the evidence available, it would 
seem that the past fifteen years or so (since 
1968) have been the worst in about one 
hundred and fifty years. In some ways the 
wetter years of the 1950s appear exceptional. 
Since only six of the twenty or so recording 
stations were established before 1940, the 
overall record may be distorted by that of the 
1950s. 
Of course, it is possible only to compare on 
the basis of observable effect because a record 
of precipitation does not exist. This compari-
son is a problematic exercise since factors other 
than the direct impact of a shortfall in 
precipitation can influence the parameters 
used as a guide. Overgrazing can cause species 
changes in grasslands just as can intensifying 
aridity; inland drainage basins can be affected 
by factors relating to land use in the catchment 
area, such as a change in crop type or in land 
use intensity. Clearly a study of process is 
made very problematic when the evidence is 
subject to so many possible influences. Similar 
difficulties face workers like Hubert Lamb, 
who not only have to rely on secondary data, 
but also upon the use of intercontinental 
extrapolations into very different climatic 
systems from studies-made usually in the 
temperate zones-as and where the data 
sources may be found. 
Recent research, which is attempting to 
correlate precipitation patterns directly to 
observable phenomena elsewhere, has sug-
gested two possible areas of causality in 
relation to Africa. The first of these links the 
changes in the incidence of the EI Nino 
current in the Pacific with rainfall in the 
southeastern part of Africa. Thus a colder 
than normal Pacific brings wetter conditions 
to the area. Alternatively, for the six-
thousand-mile stretch of semiarid Sub-Saharan 
Africa in the north, there exists ths possibility 
that changes in surface temperature over the 
Atlantic south of WON is in some way 
associated with changes in the rainfall condi-
tions in the Sahel famine belt. All this, of 
course, begs the broader question of what 
brings about these fluctuations in the spatial 
distribution of ocean temperatures, but at least 
the confirmation of some causal link would 
provide the scientific community with a pre-
dictive tool. 
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We are still left, however, with the addi-
tional problem of how far drought is an 
unavoidable consequence of uncontrollable 
natural forces and to what extent it is aggra-
vated or accentuated by the land-using or 
atmosphere-modifying activities of man. There 
remains the almost certain prospect that the 
present run of dry years-and the last two 
years have been the driest of this century-will 
come to an end and more humid conditions 
will return (Lamb, P. J. 1982). But we still do 
not know whether these dry cycles are super-
imposed on some more profound longer cycle, 
or whether man is playing an active role in 
directly or indirectly accentuating the local or 
regional impact of the climatic function 
through dust or albedo factors (Quirk 1977; 
McLeod 1976; Charney 1975). Even for one of 
the most thoroughly researched countries on 
earth, the United States, Rosenberg (1986) is 
able to show the considerable uncertainty 
surrounding the possible consequences of 
atmospheric warming over the Great Plains 
and beyond. Waggoner (1984) is relatively 
optlmistic about adaptation to weather 
changes in the U.S. as science and technology 
keep pace. Leading scientists are now engaged 
in acrimonious debate concerning the inci-
dence of, and possible consequences of, the 
"greenhouse effect" of CO, buildup in the 
atmosphere. It is not difficult, therefore, to 
sympathize with the dilemma facing policy-
makers in Africa who, even with the best 
will in the world, are trying to plan in the 
midst of the most profound uncertainty. They, 
in contrast to their American colleagues, face 
the terribly pressing problem of applying much 
more uncertain knowledge to a situation 
where the consequences of change are much 
more immediate and disastrous to the human 
population. 
HISTORY, TECHNOLOGY, AND SOCIETY 
The North American Great Plains is an 
area that has been subject to relatively recent 
colonization. In this regard there appears to be 
some similarity with the African continent, 
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which was subject to the main thrust of 
colonialism (rather than colonization) at 
roughly the same time. But there the compari-
son more or less ends, and it is extremely 
difficult to extrapolate data from the Great 
Plains to Africa. Although it is possible to 
point at events during the Dust Bowl era in 
America and perhaps see certain superficial 
similarities in the degradation and breakdown 
in semiarid Africa today (e.g., the wholesale 
migration of people, soil erosion, the role of 
technology, etc.), there are some very basic 
underlying differences. These may be briefly 
summarized as follows: 
The strong role of the subsistence sector 
in much of semiarid Africa; 
The lack of a viable alternative for 
employment in other sectors of the 
economy; 
The lack of any substantial research 
base for the major subsistence crops sup-
porting the people; 
A situation of severe capital constraint 
on the part of most farmers and govern-
ments in the region; 
The different historical experience: the 
superimposition of one culture, economy, 
and technology on top of another rather 
than the wholesale displacement that took 
place in Australia and North America. 
During the relatively recent colonial expe-
rience that affected virtually all the countries 
in semiarid Africa (including, indirectly, Ethio-
pia), profound changes were made in the 
relations between man and the environment. 
These territories "paid their way" within the 
colonial system by producing cash crops in a 
relatively unprocessed form for export. This 
commercial strain was grafted onto, rather 
than replacing, the existing "traditional" farm-
ing systems. Indeed, the colonial authorities 
required the maintenance of subsistence farm-
ing as a device to subsidize production costs 
and to obviate the necessity for social support 
payments. Thus colonialism created a demand 
for additional land almost overnight. Further-
more, it introduced monocultures of often very 
demanding crops. The French West African 
empire was very systematically divided into 
production zones for cotton, groundnuts, and 
so forth. The introduction of taxes payable in 
cash ensured that the indigenous population 
participated actively in this drive. 
On the research front, the efforts were 
concentrated almost entirely on proving the 
productivity and quality of the cash crops. 
Institutes for research on specific crops 
proliferated, an example being the Imperial 
Cotton Research Institute in Uganda. Howev-
er, there was no parallel line of major research 
into the principal food crops like the millets 
and sorghum or into the animals that keep 
alive the majority of the population in the dry 
zone. Speaking at a Washington meeting in 
January 1985, Edmond Hartmans, director of 
the Nigeria-based International Institute for 
Tropical Agriculture, stated: "Research in food 
production in Africa started around 1970. We 
shouldn't be surprised that we are only now 
beginning to see results" (Norman 1985). In 
contrast, the record of research into tropical 
cash crops goes back to the eighteenth cen-
tury. 
Much of the doomsday literature on Afri-
ca-such as the recently syndicated cartoon 
showing the countries of Africa named "West 
Ethiopia, East Ethiopia, Emerging Ethiopia"-
could be replicated by turning back to the 
writings on Asia, particularly India, in the 
early 1960s. Indeed, the full Malthusian catas-
trophe for India of a population outstripping 
its food-producing capacity was predicted to 
occur right about now. Instead, the picture is 
very different. In Asia the rate of growth of 
food production during the period 1965-75 
increased about 20 percent and eliminated 
both the massive food imports under the 
PL480 plan and commercial purchases. In 1985 
Pakistan became an exporter of grain. This was 
largely due to the development of the "Green 
Revolution" dwarf hybrids of wheat, rice, and 
maize and the associated fertilizer/pesticide 
!irrigation package. It is true that much has 
been written about the socially disruptive 
impact of this technological change, but we 
cannot escape the undeniable fact that, for the 
moment at least, dire human consequences 
have been avoided. How does this dramatic 
success relate to Africa? 
Over roughly the same period that the 
hybrids were being extended at almost 
unbelievable speed in Asia, food production in 
Africa was barely able-or in many cases was 
unable-to keep up with the rate of growth of 
the human population. So why was there no 
green revolution for Africa? The reasons are 
many. First, the Asian dilemma overshadowed 
what was happening in Africa so that most of 
the research and extension was focused there. 
Next, as far as Africa's staple grains are 
concerned there was almost no research base 
to build on. Such as it was, research focused 
essentially on luxury exports to earn foreign 
exchange. The African countries, facing recent 
declining terms of trade, the impact of oil 
shocks, and the growing expectations of the 
politically volatile urban power groups, felt 
obliged to continue this colonial preoccupa-
tion with those commodities that earned 
money abroad. Also, it is difficult to raise 
funds for research and development work on 
crops that essentially have an economic rather 
than a financial return, however important 
they may be to the food security and general 
well-being of the population. 
In addition, other factors result in local 
complications in effecting an African green 
revolution. First, the infrastructure for seed 
multiplication (since hybrids cannot reproduce 
themselves) is weak or absent, which makes 
the distribution of the innovation each year 
particularly difficult. Second, farmers who 
intend to consume the end product rather 
than put it into the commercial market have 
no means to pay for such seed. Third, in many 
countries the state-controlled pricing system 
for that portion of the crop entering the 
market is used as a device to "tax" the 
countryside to subsidize food for the urban 
population, including workers. Such a system, 
in effect, for example, in Mali ]..lntil recently, 
serves as a major disincentive to the grower. 
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Fourth, in many countries agriculture simply 
has been and is a neglected sector. Examina-
tion of the expenditure patterns of govern-
ments in the region shows that often as little as 
10 percent of state resources are devoted to 
this sector, even though 75 percent or more of 
the population are engaged in agriculture. 
So the economic, social, and political bases 
in Africa are often too weak for the sorts of 
changes outlined by Rosenberg in his review of 
technological advances in the Great Plains. 
The effort is only now beginning. Members of 
the Organization of African Unity meeting in 
Lagos toward the end of the last decade 
predicted that attention must be focused on a 
greater drive toward food security in Africa. 
However, this effort, still in its infancy, takes 
time. Some progress may be charted, such as 
the development of a hybrid sorghum combin-
ing strains bred in Nigeria and at the Texas 
A & M University that offers the prospects of 
higher yields in the Sudan and elsewhere. But 
all this will require a major concerted effort 
partly because the delivery system will be that 
much more difficult in Africa. Indeed, the new 
sorghum strain is attractive largely because the 
gains may be achieved without irrigation and 
the prospects for irrigation in Africa are seen 
as much more problematic than in the Punjab 
or elsewhere in south and southeast Asia. 
One additional problem is the attitude 
toward research on the part of government 
officials. So much research in Africa, like water 
development in semiarid regions, has had 
perverse results when implemented that gov-
ernment officials are often frustrated at the gap 
between research and implementation. One 
often hears the cry for no more research and a 
lot more action. It is clear that the research 
effort in Africa has often been characterized by 
the following: 
Concentration on export crops; 
The research station mentality produc-
ing answers too often without researching 
the real questions ("top-down" approach); 
The very late start in researching food 
crop hybrids; and 
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The lack of a systems approach to 
production problems at the farm level and 
to overcoming the observable constraints, 
including such things as infrastructure and 
credit. 
Over the last decade we have seen the 
growth, often under the aegis of the Consulta-
tive Group for International Agricultural 
Research (CGIAR), of research centers such as 
the one mentioned above in Nigeria and the 
International Livestock Center for Africa in 
Ethiopia, Kenya, and Mali. However, it is one 
thing to effect research on an integrated basis 
or on production systems; it is quite another 
matter to translate that research into action 
when the organs of government are essentially 
divided into sectors and uncommunicative. 
Unfortunately, governments all too rarely 
research themselves. Thus the administrative 
dimension remains weak, and yet it may be the 
key to any successful transformation. Since it 
is this very government structure that defines 
the need for and requests technical assistance, 
the problem is extended beyond the bounda-
ries of national policymaking. These issues 
were discussed in 1979 by UNESCO in a 
review of its scientific contribution to the 
development of the arid zones, and I have 
elsewhere presented a hypothesis with regard 
to the role of administrative structure in 
tackling global problems that I term the 
"Administrative Trap" (Baker 1976). 
THE WAY FORWARD 
Clearly the way forward is far from easy 
since it is beset with a combination of scientific 
uncertainties and polemical assertions of right-
ness by the various apologists; systemic con-
straints in the decision-making structure; and 
a very late start in developing the indigenous 
technological base to provide food security. 
The Lagos meeting suggests some realization 
on the part of the governments of the need for 
a change of direction away from the colonial 
structure. However, this realization produces 
immense problems for those governments 
because of their tremendous dependence upon 
foreign exchange to fuel the models of devel-
opment they have adopted, which in turn rely 
so much on imports for modernization. Sadly, 
the reality is that the rural majority does not 
have the political clout of the concentrated 
urban minority and so Lipton's "Urban Bias" 
prevails, though not necessarily for the reasons 
he posits (Lipton 1977). 
Time is a precious commodity since it is 
needed to confirm the various hypotheses 
regarding climatic change; to investigate how 
land use aggravates the effects of drought; to 
develop the strains and packages of a new 
green revolution for Africa; and to overcome 
the calamitous effects of the last fifteen years. 
Once it is possible to move away from the relief 
and crisis-management approach that prevails 
at the moment, then we must hope that the 
momentum will not be lost simply because 
things appear to be "getting better." It is well 
known that policymakers have a fairly short-
term time horizon, even if they have not been 
elected to office. Indeed, as J. K. Galbraith 
observed, "In the long term we are all dead." 
The African situation, with its heavy Malthu-
sian overtones, may unfortunately relate more 
directly to that observation than to any other. 
Still, everyone was saying the same thing 
about India in the 1950s and 1960s and we 
should derive some hope from that. It is quite 
clear that none of the compilers of definitive 
reports on the Great Plains could have pre-
dicted the wild card of technological change 
nor the changing role of grain exports from the 
Great Plains. But to hope for an Asian happy 
ending in Africa is more like an act of faith 
than a prognostication of science. 
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